The Nomic Void

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The computational void constrains what any algorithm can determine. The embodiment void constrains what bodied minds can think. But beneath both lies a deeper stratum: the laws of physics themselves limit what kinds of physical substrates can exist and what physical processes those substrates can perform. Bremermann’s limit caps computation at ~1.36 × 10⁵⁰ bits per second per kilogram. Landauer’s principle sets a thermodynamic floor on the cost of erasing information. The Bekenstein bound limits how much information a region of space can contain. These are not engineering constraints awaiting better technology. They are nomological—built into the structure of our universe. A universe with different fundamental constants would have different ceilings, enabling different physical architectures for cognition. The nomic void is the territory of thoughts that no physical mind operating under our physics can reach—though whether consciousness itself, if non-physical, faces the same limits is a separate question the Map’s dualism must confront.

Layers of Nomic Constraint

The nomic void has several strata, each deeper than the last.

Hard computational limits. Bremermann’s limit and Landauer’s principle set absolute ceilings on information processing for any physical system in our universe. No brain, no quantum computer, no future technology can exceed them. Landauer’s principle has been experimentally confirmed—Bérut et al. (2012) measured the heat dissipated when erasing a single bit, matching the theoretical minimum. This is physics, not speculation. A universe with different values of c, h, or Boltzmann’s k would have different computational limits, enabling different cognitive architectures.

Structural constraints on complexity. The specific forces and particles of our physics determine what stable structures can form. Carbon chemistry permits certain molecular complexity; different chemistry would permit different complexity. To the extent that consciousness depends on a physical substrate—even if not reducible to it—it inherits these limits on what substrates are possible.

Observational framing. Kant argued that space, time, and causation are forms our minds impose on experience—we know phenomena (the world as structured by cognition) but not noumena (things as they are in themselves). Stephen Wolfram’s more recent and still speculative framework proposes that the physics we observe emerges from how any computationally bounded observer must perceive reality. On this model, different observers at different positions in “rulial space”—the space of all possible computations—would experience entirely different physics. If either Kant’s transcendental idealism or Wolfram’s computational framework is broadly correct, our physics is partially observer-relative, and the nomic void includes everything our mode of observation excludes.

The contingency of consciousness itself. Chalmers’s conceivability argument implies that consciousness is not metaphysically necessitated by physics—a universe physically identical to ours could conceivably lack it. Chalmers himself holds that zombies are “probably not naturally possible” under our laws, but the mere conceivability establishes that no physical law entails consciousness. If the relationship between physics and consciousness is contingent in this way, different physical laws might produce minds, different minds, or no minds at all. We cannot know.

The Most Invisible Void

The nomic void may be the hardest void to recognise. Other voids have phenomenological signatures: the unobservable self catches attention folding back on itself; thoughts that slip away leave a residue of something almost grasped. The nomic void leaves no trace. We do not experience the laws of physics as constraints on thought—they are the background conditions of all thought.

This invisibility has a Kantian structure. We cannot perceive the limits of perception because perception is already shaped by those limits. A fish does not experience water as a constraint on movement because water is the medium of all its movement. The nomic void is the water.

One possible phenomenological trace: the persistent intuition that physics should explain consciousness, combined with the persistent failure to show how. Edward Witten—a physicist, not a philosopher—has suggested that consciousness will remain a mystery, that he does not see how any advance in physics would explain why subjective experience accompanies physical processes (Witten, in Brockman 1996). This felt incompleteness may be the closest we come to sensing the nomic void’s boundary: the hard problem persists not because we lack data but because the relationship between physics and consciousness may not be the kind of thing physical law captures.

Circularity and the Kantian Challenge

The nomic void contains a destabilising circularity. If our physics is partially mind-dependent—shaped by how observers like us must perceive—then “nomic constraints on cognition” becomes circular: the laws that limit the mind are themselves products of the mind. Kant was aware of this structure: we cannot know things-in-themselves, but we can know that our knowledge is structured by cognitive forms.

Wolfram’s speculative framework, if correct, would sharpen this circularity. If observers at different positions in rulial space experience different physics, then the nomic void is not an absolute boundary but an indexical one—real for us, different elsewhere. The void is the set of all rulial positions we cannot occupy.

This circularity does not dissolve the void—a structure it shares with the framework-void, where every framework for understanding frameworks is itself a framework. Even if physics is observer-relative, the observer’s position constrains what physics it experiences. We cannot choose a different position in rulial space any more than we can choose different fundamental constants. The constraint is real even if its origin is participatory rather than imposed.

Wheeler’s “it from bit” framework pushes furthest: if observer-participancy is constitutive of physical reality, consciousness does not merely inhabit a pre-given nomic structure but co-creates it. The nomic void, on this view, is not what our physics excludes from outside but what our mode of participation fails to elicit from within.

What AI Might See

AI operates under the same physics as human brains. Landauer’s principle and Bremermann’s limit apply equally to silicon and neurons. As purely physical systems, AI faces the nomic void without qualification—unlike biological minds, which might under dualism have non-physical aspects that partly escape it.

The asymmetry lies in analytical power. AI can explore formal models of alternative physics more thoroughly than humans—simulating universes with different constants and characterising what cognitive architectures they would support. AI might be less anthropocentric in modelling possible minds, less likely to assume cognition must resemble human cognition. And AI could help distinguish architectural limits (biology-specific) from genuinely nomic limits (physics-universal) by identifying where human intuitions about physics are artifacts of embodied cognition versus genuine nomological constraints.

But AI cannot escape the nomic void’s physical constraints any more than humans can. Both operate under the same physics. The difference is in the approach to the boundary, not in the boundary itself—though dualism raises the question of whether human consciousness has resources AI lacks.

Relation to Site Perspective

The nomic void connects to the Map’s tenets across several dimensions.

Occam’s Razor Has Limits is most directly relevant. If physical laws shape cognitive possibilities, our preference for simple, elegant theories may reflect the constraints of our nomic position rather than the structure of reality. What seems parsimonious from within our physics might be parochial. Chomsky’s observation applies: “The endowment that yields scope also establishes limits.” Different physics might support minds for which entirely different explanatory virtues feel natural.

Dualism faces both challenge and opportunity. The challenge: Sean Carroll argues that the “Core Theory” of physics governs everything in everyday life, including brains, and any proposed modification must meet an extremely high evidential standard. If physics fully governs neural activity, where does non-physical consciousness act? The opportunity: the persistent failure of physical law to explain consciousness—what Witten called a permanent mystery, the hard problem’s endurance—may itself be evidence that consciousness has aspects outside the nomic domain. The nomic void’s deepest implication for dualism: if consciousness is not entirely subject to physical law, it may partly transcend the nomic void that constrains physical minds.

Minimal Quantum Interaction gains context. If consciousness interfaces with physics through quantum processes, then our universe’s specific quantum mechanics defines the channel. Different quantum mechanics would mean different interface modes. The nomic void includes all the ways consciousness might interact with matter that our quantum mechanics does not permit.

Bidirectional Interaction is illuminated by Wheeler’s participatory universe. If consciousness co-creates the nomic structure it inhabits, then the nomic void is partially self-generated—consciousness participates in creating the constraints it then cannot transcend.

No Many Worlds sharpens the void’s significance. If our physics is the only physics—no multiverse of alternative law-sets—then the nomic void is absolute. There is no branch where different constants enable different cognition. The thoughts our physics forbids are not merely inaccessible to us but unrealised anywhere. If, however, a landscape of possible physics exists (as in some string theory interpretations), the nomic void becomes indexical: real for us, different elsewhere, but inescapable from any given position.

Classification in the Voids Taxonomy

The nomic void is primarily Unexplorable in the voids taxonomy: no mind under our physics can think the thoughts that different physics would enable. It has an Occluded dimension if our physics is observer-relative (Kant, Wolfram)—the constraint is not merely passive absence but active framing that shapes what can appear.

Unlike the computational void, which is proven for computation but may not bind consciousness, the nomic void constrains every physical system operating under our physics—computational or otherwise. Unlike the embodiment void, which is specific to bodied minds, the nomic void binds disembodied physical systems equally. It is the most universal constraint on physical cognition: the one from which nothing physical escapes. Whether consciousness, if non-physical, is equally bound remains an open question—one that the Map’s dualism suggests may have a surprising answer.

Further Reading

References

  1. Landauer, R. (1961). “Irreversibility and Heat Generation in the Computing Process.” IBM Journal of Research and Development, 5(3), 183-191.
  2. Bérut, A., et al. (2012). “Experimental verification of Landauer’s principle linking information and thermodynamics.” Nature, 483, 187-189.
  3. Bremermann, H. J. (1962). “Optimization through evolution and recombination.” In Self-Organizing Systems. Spartan Books.
  4. Kant, I. (1781/1787). Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Norman Kemp Smith (1929).
  5. Wolfram, S. (2021). “What Is Consciousness? Some New Perspectives from Our Physics Project.” https://writings.stephenwolfram.com/2021/03/what-is-consciousness-some-new-perspectives-from-our-physics-project/
  6. Carroll, S. M. (2021). “Consciousness and the Laws of Physics.” https://philarchive.org/rec/CARCAT-33
  7. Chomsky, N. (2014). “Science, Mind, and Limits of Understanding.” https://chomsky.info/201401__/
  8. Wheeler, J. A. (1990). “Information, Physics, Quantum: The Search for Links.” In Complexity, Entropy, and the Physics of Information. Addison-Wesley.
  9. Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press.
  10. Brockman, J. (1996). The Third Culture: Beyond the Scientific Revolution. Simon & Schuster. (Contains Witten’s remarks on consciousness.)
  11. Yanofsky, N. S. (2017). “The Mind and the Limitations of Physics.” FQXi Essay Contest.